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1 Introduction
Decision-makers often have to choose between letting one agent be responsi-
ble for two tasks, or letting two di¤erent agents be responsible for one task
each. For example, when an infrastructure facility is built (rst task) and
subsequently operated (second task), it has to be decided whether the same
contractor or two di¤erent contractors should be in charge of the two tasks.1
When a new government is formed, there can be a single department respon-
sible for di¤erent elds, or there can be separate departments in charge of the
di¤erent elds.2
In an important contribution, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) have pointed
out that the di¤erent tasks which a principal delegates to an agent can often
be conicting; i.e., one task (e.g., promoting growth or creating jobs) can
be directly detrimental to another task (e.g., protecting the environment or
enhancing social security). This may lead the principal to delegate these tasks
to di¤erent agents, since it appears to be di¢ cult to motivate one agent to work
on two conicting tasks. While Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) considered an
incomplete contracting model, Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, Section 6.2.2)
show that similar issues can also be fruitfully studied in a complete contracting
framework.
1For instance, in the recent case of two new Ohio River spans, the only method allowed
under current Kentucky law is the traditional approach, which means that there are di¤erent
contractors. Yet, the alternative option of having one contractor in charge of both tasks is
also currently discussed, which would require action by the Kentucky General Assembly
(The Courier-Journal, October 6, 2011). In the case of the Port of Miami Tunnel, a major
construction project in Florida with an estimated cost of 1 billion U.S. dollars, it was decided
to let the private contractor MAT Concessionaire LLC be in charge of both tasks (Miami
Herald, April 17, 2010).
2For instance, in the current Government of New South Wales led by Premier Barry
OFarrell, there now is a so-called super-ministry led by Andrew Stoner, who is both
Minister for Trade and Investment and Minister for Regional Infrastructure and Services
(The Sydney Morning Herald, April 3, 2011).
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Specically, Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) assume that the tasks are per-
formed simultaneously and that there is an e¤ort externality between the tasks,
such that e¤ort in one task may reduce the success probability of another task.3
Their main nding is that if the conict between the tasks is su¢ ciently strong,
then the principal prefers to hire two di¤erent agents to work on the two tasks.
In contrast, when the tasks are not conicting, only one agent should be in
charge of both tasks, since it is cheaper for the principal to incentivize one
agent (a bonus must only be paid when both tasks are successful).
In the present paper, we consider tasks that for technological reasons can
only be performed sequentially. For instance, construction of a facility must
take place before its operation. In the case of sequential tasks, it is plausible
that there may be an outcome externality between the tasks. When the second
task is performed, the outcome of the rst task is already realized, and this
outcome may a¤ect the success probability of the second task. (If instead an
e¤ort externality were present, then the e¤ort expended on the rst task not
the outcomewould a¤ect the success probability of the second task.)
For example, in an infrastructure project, e¤ort may be exerted in an initial
phase to come up with an innovative design that is particularly cheap to build.
In the subsequent operation stage, the costs of infrastructure maintenance
may (positively or negatively) depend on the outcome of the rst stage (i.e.,
whether or not an innovative facility was built). Similarly, a principal may
want an agent to sell a durable good (say, a tablet computer or a mobile
phone) today, but she may also want an agent to sell the next generation of
the device tomorrow. In this case, if a consumer has already bought the durable
good today, then it can be more di¢ cult to sell the next generation product
to him tomorrow. Again, it is plausible that it is the rst-stage outcome (i.e.,
whether or not the good was successfully sold) and not the rst-stage e¤ort
3As an illustration, consider a principal who wants two goods to be sold. When the goods
are imperfect substitutes, then e¤ort to sell one product may make it more di¢ cult to sell
the other product.
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which makes the second-stage task more easy or more di¢ cult.
The main nding of the present paper is that when there is an outcome
externality, then the ndings of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) are overturned.
If the tasks are in conict, so that a success in the rst task makes e¤ort in the
second task less e¤ective, then the principal is better o¤ when she hires only
one agent in charge of both tasks. In contrast, if there are synergies between
the tasks, then the principal prefers to hire two di¤erent agents for the two
di¤erent tasks. The intuitive explanation is as follows. In the presence of
limited liability, the principal cannot make the agent pay a ne when there is no
success. Hence, the only possibility to motivate an agent to exert unobservable
e¤ort is to o¤er him a bonus when there is a success, so that the agent enjoys
a rent.4 In particular, when e¤ort is not very e¤ective in increasing the success
probability, then the rent that the principal must promise the agent has to be
large in order to give him an incentive to work hard.
Now consider a two-stage model. When exerting e¤ort in the second stage
becomes less e¤ective, it becomes more di¢ cult to motivate the agent in charge
of the second stage to work, so that the principal has to increase the rent that
she must leave to the agent when she wants to implement high e¤ort. When
the tasks are conicting, an agent who is in charge in both stages now has
an additional incentive to exert e¤ort in the rst stage, because by making
second-stage e¤ort less e¤ective, he can increase the rent that he can enjoy
in the second stage. In contrast, when there are synergies, it is better for
the principal to hire two di¤erent agents, because a single agent would now
be tempted to shirk in the rst stage (and thus make second-stage e¤ort less
e¤ective) in order to increase his second-stage rent.
It is important to note that this logic applies only if it is the outcome of the
rst stage that has an impact on the second stage. Specically, we show that
4La¤ont and Martimort (2002) use the term limited liability rent to distinguish the
rent in moral hazard models with wealth constraints from the related concept of information
rents that a principal has to leave to agents in adverse selection models.
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when tasks have to be performed sequentially but there is an e¤ort externality
instead of an outcome externality, then the results are qualitatively similar to
those obtained by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
By now, there is a large contract-theoretic literature on multi-task principal-
agent problems in the presence of moral hazard.5 Early contributions such as
Holmström and Milgrom (1991) and Itoh (1994) were based on the trade-o¤
between incentives and insurance when agents are risk-averse. As has been
emphasized by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, p. 234), traditional multi-task
models were often focused on the e¤ort-substitution problem (an agent who
engages in di¤erent activities may have higher/lower e¤ort costs when the
tasks are substitutes/complements). In contrast, following Bolton and Dewa-
tripont (2005), we consider a complete contracting framework with risk-neutral
but wealth-constrained agents,6 in which an agents e¤ort costs of perform-
ing a given task are independent of whether the agent is also in charge of
another task. While many studies in the multi-task agency literature focus
on simultaneous tasks, there are by now also some papers that explore set-
tings in which tasks have to be performed sequentially; see in particular Hirao
(1993), Schmitz (2005), Khalil et al. (2006), Berkovitch et al. (2010), Kräkel
and Schöttner (2010, 2011), Müller (2011), and Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012).
Yet, these contributions do not consider conicting tasks, which are the focus
of the present paper.7 Finally, so far there are only relatively few experimental
5For reviews, see Dewatripont et al. (2000), La¤ont and Martimort (2002, ch. 5), and
Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, ch. 6).
6Innes (1990), Pitchford (1998), and Tirole (2001) study related e¢ ciency wagemodels
in the contract-theoretic sense of Tirole (1999, p. 745) and La¤ont and Martimort (2002,
p. 174). See also Kragl and Schöttner (2011), who study whether a principal should hire
one or two agents to perform simultaneous tasks in the presence of wage oors.
7Moreover, each paper also di¤ers in other respects from the present model. For instance,
in Hirao (1993) and Berkovitch et al. (2010), a project is selected in the rst stage, while
unobservable e¤ort is exerted in the second stage only. In Schmitz (2005), no rent can be
earned in the rst stage and when high e¤ort is always to be implemented, the principal
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studies on multi-task moral hazard models. However, recently Hoppe and Kus-
terer (2011) have found evidence supporting Bolton and Dewatriponts (2005)
ndings in a large-scale laboratory experiment.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, a simple
model with sequential tasks and outcome externalities is introduced. Section 3
characterizes the principals optimal contract. The case of e¤ort externalities
is briey discussed in section 4. Concluding remarks follow in section 5. All
proofs have been relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
Consider a principal who wants two sequential tasks to be performed. The
veriable outcome of task i 2 f1; 2g is denoted by qi 2 f0; 1g : If task i is a
success (qi = 1), the principal obtains a revenue R, otherwise her revenue in
stage i is zero. The principal can either employ a single agent to perform both
tasks, or she can employ two di¤erent agents for the two di¤erent tasks. All
parties are risk neutral. An agent has no wealth and his reservation utility is
zero.9 E¤ort on task i 2 f1; 2g is denoted by ei 2 f0; 1g : An agent who exerts
would never hire one agent in charge of both stages. In Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012)
and Müller (2011), the second-stage technology is independent of the rst stage (see also
Nieken and Schmitz, 2012, for a related laboratory experiment). Kräkel and Schöttner
(2010) analyze an incomplete contracting model with short-term contracts, while in Kräkel
and Schöttner (2011) there are always two agents hired in the rst stage. Khalil et al. (2006)
assume that there is an adverse selection problem in the second stage.
8In Hoppe and Kusterers (2011) experiment, the agents were salespersons who could
promote one or two products. When the products were substitutes, so that the tasks are
conicting in the sense of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), high e¤ort levels were observed
signicantly less often when there was one agent in charge of both tasks compared to the
case of two agents. In the absence of conict, the principal was better o¤ when she hired
just one agent, as predicted by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
9Notice that if the agents were not protected by limited liability, the principal could
always attain the rst-best solution by making an agent residual claimant; i.e. the principal
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e¤ort ei incurs a disutility of e¤ort  ei. The e¤ort levels are not observable.
The probability that the rst task is a success is given by Prfq1 = 1g =
+ e1. The probability that the second task is a success is given by Prfq2 =
1g =  + q1e2: Throughout, we assume that the parameters ; ; 0; 1 are
strictly positive and  < 1   maxf; 0; 1g, so that the expressions that
describe probabilities lie between zero and one. Observe that even if the agent
shirks, there is a success with probability  > 0.10 Moreover, it may depend
on the outcome of the rst stage (q1) how e¤ective e¤ort in the second stage
is. Specically, note that the two tasks are technologically independent if
1 = 0: We say that the two tasks are conicting if 1 < 0. In this case,
a success in the rst stage makes e¤ort in the second stage less e¤ective (i.e.,
there is a negative outcome externality). In contrast, we say that the tasks are
synergistic if 1 > 0. In this case, a success in the rst stage makes e¤ort in
the second stage more e¤ective (i.e., there is a positive outcome externality).
Note that since the two agents are identical, in a rst-best world (i.e., if
e¤ort were contractible) it would make no di¤erence whether the principal
hires one or two agents. Following Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), we assume
throughout that the principals revenueR is su¢ ciently large so that she always
wants to implement high e¤ort. Hence, we can focus on the question whether
the principals expected costs are smaller when she hires one or two agents.
To induce an agent to exert e¤ort, the principal can o¤er him a wage scheme
wq1q2 : = w(q1; q2)  0 that is contingent on the outcomes of both tasks.
would simply leave her revenue to the agent in exchange for a suitable up-front payment, so
that the expected payo¤ of the agent would be zero.
10Note that the rst-best solution could always be attained if  were equal to zero, because
then in case of a success the principal knew for sure that the agent has exerted high e¤ort.
The principal would then just reimburse the agent for his e¤ort costs, so that the agent
would make zero expected prot. In contrast, if  is strictly positive, there can also be a
success when the agent shirks. Hence, the principal must leave a rent to the agent, because
if the principal just o¤ered to reimburse the agents e¤ort costs, the agent would get zero in
expectation if he exerts e¤ort, while he would get a positive rent if he shirks.
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3 The main results
Suppose rst that the principal has hired only one agent to perform both tasks.
Since e¤ort is unobservable, the principal must ensure that it is in the agents
self-interest to choose high e¤ort. Hence, the agents expected utility when he
exerts high e¤ort (incurring e¤ort costs  ) must be larger than his expected
utility when he shirks. The incentive compatibility constraints ensuring that
the agent exerts high e¤ort in the second stage are
(+ 1)w11 + (1    1)w10     w11 + (1  )w10
for the case that the rst stage was a success (q1 = 1) and
(+ 0)w01 + (1    0)w00     w01 + (1  )w00
for the case that the rst stage was a failure (q1 = 0). The agent is willing to
exert high e¤ort in the rst stage if the incentive compatibility constraint
(+ )[(+ 1)w11 + (1    1)w10    ]
+(1    )[(+ 0)w01 + (1    0)w00    ]   
 [(+ 1)w11 + (1    1)w10    ]
+(1  )[(+ 0)w01 + (1    0)w00    ]
is satised.
The principals problem is to nd a wage scheme (w00;w10; w01; w11) in order
to minimize her expected costs
(+)[(+1)w11+(1  1)w10]+(1  )[(+0)w01+(1  0)w00]
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints and the limited liability con-
straints wq1q2  0. Since the agent always has the possibility to choose low
e¤ort without incurring any costs, incentive compatibility and limited liability
together imply that the agents participation constraint is always satised.
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Lemma 1 Suppose the principal has delegated both tasks to one agent.
(i) If 01 + (1   0)  0, it is optimal for the principal to o¤er the
contract w00 = w10 = 0; w01 =  =0; and
w11 =  
0 + (+ 0)
0(+ 1)
:
Then her expected costs are 
+ 

+
+ 0
0

 :
(ii) If 01 + (1   0) < 0, the principal will o¤er the contract w00 =
w10 = 0; w01 =  =0; and w11 =  =1: Then her expected costs are
(+ )
+ 1
1
+ (1    )+ 0
0

 :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that it is optimal for the principal not to make a payment to the
agent when the second stage was not successful, regardless of the outcome of
the rst stage (w00 = w10 = 0). Clearly, the principal does not want to reward
the agent for a failure. However, a second-stage success is rewarded even if
the rst stage was a failure (w01 > 0). This is necessary in order to induce the
agent to work hard in the second stage, even when he was not successful in the
rst stage (the second-stage incentive compatibility constraint conditional on
a rst-stage failure is always binding). With regard to the bonus w11 that is
paid when both stages are successful, a case distinction has to be made.11 Case
(i) always applies if the tasks are synergistic (1 > 0), and it also applies if a
conict between the tasks is not too strong. It turns out that the second-stage
incentive compatibility constraint conditional on a rst-stage success then is
not binding; i.e., the wage scheme that motivates the agent to work hard in
the rst stage is su¢ cient to also motivate him to work hard in the second
stage after a rst-stage success. If the conict is very strong, 1   0 may be
11Note that the assumptions that we made (to ensure that all expressions describing
probabilities lie between zero and one) allow 01 + (1   0) to be positive or negative.
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so negative that we are in case (ii). In this case, it is very di¢ cult to motivate
the agent to work hard in the second stage following a rst-stage success, so
that the corresponding incentive compatibility constraint then is binding.
Suppose now that the principal has hired two di¤erent agents for the two
di¤erent tasks. Let agent A be in charge of task 1, while agent B is respon-
sible for task 2. The incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that agent A
chooses high e¤ort in the rst stage (given that agent B will be induced to
exert high e¤ort in the second stage) reads
(+ )[(+ 1)w
A
11 + (1    1)wA10]
+(1    )[(+ 0)wA01 + (1    0)wA00]   
 [(+ 1)wA11 + (1    1)wA10]
+(1  )[(+ 0)wA01 + (1    0)wA00]:
The incentive compatibility constraints that ensure that agent B chooses high
e¤ort in the second stage are
(+ 1)w
B
11 + (1    1)wB10     wB11 + (1  )wB10
for the case that the rst stage was a success and
(+ 0)w
B
01 + (1    0)wB00     wB01 + (1  )wB00
for the case that the rst stage was a failure.
The principal designs wage schemes (wA00;w
A
10; w
A
01; w
A
11) and (w
B
00;w
B
10; w
B
01; w
B
11)
in order to minimize her expected costs
(+ )[(+ 1)(w
A
11 + w
B
11) + (1    1)(wA10 + wB10)]
+(1    )[(+ 0)(wA01 + wB01) + (1    0)(wA00 + wB00)]
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints and the limited liability con-
straints wAq1q2  0 and wBq1q2  0. Note that these constraints again imply that
the participation constraints are satised.
10
Lemma 2 Suppose the principal has hired two di¤erent agents to work on
the two di¤erent tasks. It is optimal for the principal to o¤er the contracts
wA11 = w
A
10 =  =; w
A
01 = w
A
00 = 0 and w
B
11 =  =1; w
B
01 =  =0; w
B
10 = w
B
00 = 0.
Then the principals expected costs are
(+ )

1

+
+ 1
1
+ (1    )+ 0
0

 :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that agent A is rewarded whenever the rst stage is successful
(wA11 = w
A
10 > 0) and agent B is rewarded whenever the second stage is suc-
cessful (wB11 > 0; w
B
01 > 0), while the other wages are zero. All incentive
compatibility constraints are binding. Note that the reward that agent B gets
after a rst-stage success (wB11 =  =1) is larger than the reward he gets after
a rst-stage failure (wB01 =  =0) whenever the tasks are conicting (1 < 0),
and vice versa if the tasks are synergistic.
We can now compare the principals expected costs that we have derived
in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 in order to determine when the principal is better
o¤ hiring one agent or two agents. Our main result can be stated as follows.
Proposition 1 Consider the case of output externalities.
(i) If the two tasks are conicting (1 < 0), then the principal prefers to
hire one agent who is in charge of both tasks.
(ii) If the two tasks are synergistic (1 > 0), then the principal prefers to
hire two di¤erent agents for the two di¤erent tasks.
(iii) If the two tasks are independent (1 = 0), then the principal is indif-
ferent between hiring one or two agents.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Intuitively, consider the case of conicting tasks, so that a success in the
rst stage implies that it becomes more di¢ cult to be successful in the second
task. Hence, when the outcome of the rst stage was a success, then the agent
in charge of the second stage must get a larger rent in order to motivate him to
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exert high second-stage e¤ort. For this reason, if the same agent is in charge of
both stages, there is an additional incentive for him to exert high e¤ort in the
rst stage (since high rst-stage e¤ort increases the probability that he will get
a larger rent in the second stage). In contrast, consider the case of synergistic
tasks. If the outcome of the rst stage was a success, then the principal has to
pay only a relatively small rent to the agent in charge of the second stage in
order to induce high second-stage e¤ort. If the same agent were in charge of
both stages, it would thus be more di¢ cult to motivate him to work hard in the
rst stage (since by shirking in the rst stage he can increase the probability
that he will get a larger rent in the second stage).
4 E¤ort externalities
We now briey consider a model in which the tasks still have to be performed
sequentially, but instead of an outcome externality as in the main part of
the present paper, there is an e¤ort externality as in Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005).
Specically, consider the following modication of our basic model. While
the probability of a rst-stage success is still given by Prfq1 = 1g = +e1, the
probability of a second-stage success is now given by Prfq2 = 1g = +e2 e1,
regardless of the rst-stage outcome. Hence, the tasks are now conicting if
 > 0, while they are synergistic if  < 0. In line with Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005), we assume that in the second stage the e¤ect of rst-stage e¤ort is
smaller than the e¤ect of second-stage e¤ort, jj < , and that maxf; 0g <
 < 1    + minf; 0g, so that the expressions describing probabilities lie
between zero and one.
Suppose the principal has hired one agent. The principals problem is to
nd non-negative wages (w00;w10; w01; w11) that minimize her expected costs
(+)[(+ )w11+(1  +)w10]+(1  )[(+ )w01+(1  +)w00]:
The second-stage incentive compatibility constraints are (w11  w10)   for
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the case that the rst stage was a success and (w01   w00)   for the case
that the rst stage was a failure. The agent is willing to exert high e¤ort in
the rst stage if the incentive compatibility constraint
(+ )[(+   )w11 + (1    + )w10    ]
+(1    )[(+   )w01 + (1    + )w00    ]   
 [(+ )w11 + (1    )w10    ]
+(1  )[(+ )w01 + (1    )w00    ]
is satised. Hence, the following result must hold.
Lemma 3 Consider e¤ort externalities and suppose the principal has dele-
gated both tasks to one agent.
(i) If   0, it is optimal for the principal to o¤er the contract w00 = w10 =
0; w01 =  =; and
w11 =
+ (+ )(  ) + 
(+ ) (  )   :
Then her expected costs are 2[1 + =(  )] .
(ii) If  > 0, the principal will o¤er the contract w00 = 0; w10 = ( + ) =2;
w01 =  =; and w11 = ( + 2) =2. Then her expected costs are [2 + (2 +
)=2] .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that in the case of synergistic tasks, the agent does not get a reward
if the second task fails. In contrast, in the case of conicting tasks, when there
was a rst-stage success the agent even gets a reward if the second task is
a failure. Intuitively, in the case of conict, a failure in the second stage is
indicative of high e¤ort in the rst stage. Moreover, note that the principal
must always pay a positive wage when there is a second-stage success even
when the rst stage was a failure, because otherwise the agent would shirk in
the second stage if the rst stage was not successful.12
12Notice that this observation is di¤erent from the simultaneous choice setting in Bolton
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Suppose now that the principal has hired two di¤erent agents, so that
agent A is in charge of task 1 and agent B is in charge of task 2. The principal
designs non-negative wages (wA00;w
A
10; w
A
01; w
A
11) and (w
B
00;w
B
10; w
B
01; w
B
11) in order
to minimize her expected costs
(+ )[(+   )(wA11 + wB11) + (1    + )(wA10 + wB10)]
+(1    )[(+   )(wA01 + wB01) + (1    + )(wA00 + wB00)]:
The incentive compatibility constraint ensuring that agent A chooses high
e¤ort in the rst stage (given that agent B will be induced to exert high e¤ort
in the second stage) can be written as
(+ ) (  )wA11 + ((1    ) + (+ ))wA10
  ((+ )(  ) + )wA01   (1    ) (  )wA00   :
The incentive compatibility constraints which ensure that agent B chooses high
e¤ort in the second stage are (wB11   wB10)   and (wB01   wB00)   : Thus,
we obtain the following result.
Lemma 4 Consider e¤ort externalities and suppose the principal has hired
two di¤erent agents to work on the two di¤erent tasks. The principal sets
wB00 = w
B
10 = 0 and w
B
11 = w
B
01 =  =.
(i) If   0, it is optimal for the principal to set wA00 = wA01 = wA10 = 0; and
w11 =  =[(+ ) (  )]: Then her expected costs are
(2  ) (+   )
(  )   :
(ii) If  > 0, the principal will set wA00 = w
A
01 = w
A
11 = 0; and w
A
10 =
 =[(1    ) + (+ )]: Then her expected costs are
+   

+
(1    + )(+ )
(1    ) + (+ )

 :
and Dewatripont (2005), in which it is possible to induce high e¤orts in both tasks by paying
a positive wage if and only if both tasks are successful. This is not possible in our model,
where the rst-stage outcome is known when the second-stage e¤ort level is chosen.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that agent B must get a reward for a second-stage success regard-
less of the outcome of the rst stage to motivate him to always exert high
e¤ort. However, in the case of synergistic tasks, agent A gets a reward only if
both tasks are successful, while in the case of conicting tasks, agent A gets
a reward only if task 1 is a success and task 2 is a failure (since in the latter
case a failure of task 2 is indicative of high e¤ort in task 1).
Proposition 2 Consider the case of e¤ort externalities.
(i) If the two tasks are conicting ( > 0), then the principal prefers to
hire two di¤erent agents for the two di¤erent tasks.
(ii) If the two tasks are synergistic ( < 0), then the principal prefers to
hire one agent who is in charge of both tasks.
(iii) If the two tasks are independent ( = 0), then the principal is indif-
ferent between hiring one or two agents.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that in a model with e¤ort externalities, the insights of
Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) and Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) are quali-
tatively robust also when the tasks are performed sequentially. The principal
prefers to hire two di¤erent agents when the tasks are conicting because it
is di¢ cult to motivate an agent to work hard on one task when this reduces
the success probability of the other task.13 Specically, a success in task 2
may indicate that the agent worked hard in the second stage, but it might
13Note that in the simultaneous setting of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), the principal
prefers to hire two agents only if the conict between the tasks is su¢ ciently strong, while
she strictly prefers to hire one agent when the tasks are independent. In contrast, in the
sequential model the principal prefers two agents whenever the tasks are conicting. The
reason is that as has been pointed out in footnote 12, in the simultaneous setting the principal
can save rents by hiring one agent and paying him a positive wage if and only if both tasks
are successful, which does not work in the sequential setting. As a consequence, hiring one
agent has an additional advantage in the simultaneous setting.
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also indicate that he shirked in the rst stage. In contrast, in the model with
outcome externalities analyzed in the main part of the paper, given the rst-
stage outcome, the outcome of stage 2 could not be indicative of the e¤ort level
chosen in stage 1. Taken together, when a principal has to decide whether to
delegate two sequential tasks to one agent or to two agents, it is of crucial
importance whether the second stage is inuenced by the rst-stage e¤ort or
by the rst-stage outcome.
5 Concluding remarks
When a principal wants to induce high e¤orts in two sequential tasks, then
for incentive reasons she may be better o¤ hiring one agent if the tasks are in
conict, while she may prefer to hire two di¤erent agents if there are synergies
between the tasks. This result holds when there is an outcome externality;
i.e., when the outcome of the rst stage can make it more or less di¢ cult
to be successful in the second stage. In contrast, when there is an e¤ort
externality, so that rst-stage e¤ort has a direct impact on the second-stage
success probability, then the opposite result holds.
Several avenues for future research seem to be promising. The model was
kept as simple as possible to highlight the e¤ects in a clear way. In future
work, the model could be extended to cover also adverse selection aspects,
where agents have private information about their types.14 The interaction of
limited liability rents and information rents can be complicated (see La¤ont
and Martimort, 2002), but might lead to interesting new insights. Moreover,
since the model is very simple, it might be useful as a building block in more
applied work. For instance, the rst and second stage could correspond to
di¤erent levels of a supply chain, so that when the same decision-maker is
14Models analyzing task assignment and job design from an adverse selection perspective
include Riordan and Sappington (1987), Dana (1993), Gilbert and Riordan (1995), and
Lewis and Sappington (1997).
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in charge of both stages, there would be vertical integration according to the
traditional denition in the industrial organization literature.15 Moreover, the
question whether or not there should be term limits for politicians (cf. Besley
and Case, 1995) is closely related to the question whether or not the same
agent should be in charge of sequential tasks. Furthermore, starting with Hart
(2003) and Bennett and Iossa (2006), several authors have recently pointed
out that an important characteristic of so-called public-private partnerships is
that the two stages of building and subsequently managing a public facility are
delegated to one agent (a consortium), while under traditional procurement the
two sequential tasks of building and managing are delegated to two di¤erent
contractors. While the relevance of both positive and negative externalities
between the stages is also a common theme in this applied literature,16 the
e¤ects of conicting tasks in a moral hazard framework as analyzed in the
present paper have not yet been considered there. Integrating these kinds of
externalities might lead to interesting novel insights.
15See Tirole (1988, ch. 4) and cf. Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and
Hart (1995) for an incomplete contracting perspective on vertical integration.
16See Martimort and Pouyet (2008), Chen and Chiu (2010, 2011), De Brux and Desrieux
(2011), Iossa and Martimort (2012), Hoppe and Schmitz (2012), and Martimort and Straub
(2012). See also the related theoretical studies on privatization by Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1997) and Hoppe and Schmitz (2010).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Note that the incentive compatibility constraints can be rewritten such that
they read 1(w11   w10)   and 0(w01   w00)   in the second stage, and
[(+ 1)w11 + (1    1)w10   (+ 0)w01   (1    0)w00]   
in the rst stage. Observe rst that w00 = 0 must hold in the solution to
the principals problem.17 Hence, the incentive compatibility constraint for
the second stage after a rst-stage failure now reads 0w01   . Note that
in the optimum this constraint must be binding, w01 =  =0. The rst-stage
incentive compatibility constraint can thus be rewritten as
[w10 + (+ 1)(w11   w10)  (+ 0) =0]   .
(i) Ignore for a moment the second-stage incentive compatibility constraint
conditional on a rst-stage success, 1(w11   w10)   . Then the binding
rst-stage incentive compatibility constraint implies
w11 = w10 +
 =+ (+ 0) =0   w10
+ 1
.
The omitted constraint 1(w11   w10)   is thus satised whenever
w10  01 + (1   0)
01
 :
Hence, we have found the solution in the case 01 + (1   0)  0. Note
that the principal has some freedom in choosing w11 and w10 when 01+(1 
0) > 0, since there are multiple combinations of these two wages leading to
the (uniquely determined) minimal expected costs [(+ )=+ (+ 0)=0] .
Specically, the principal can always set w10 = 0 and
w11 =  
0 + (+ 0)
0(+ 1)
;
17To see this, assume that in the solution w00 > 0 would hold. Then the principals
expected prot could be increased by reducing w00 without violating any constraints, con-
tradicting the optimality of w00 > 0.
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as stated in the lemma.
(ii) Next consider the case 01 + (1   0) < 0, so that the constraint
1(w11 w10)   must be binding. Hence, w11 =  =1+w10. The rst-stage
incentive compatibility constraint is then satised whenever
w10   

1

  + 1
1
+
+ 0
0

:
The right-hand side of this constraint is negative, since 01+(1 0) < 0.
Thus, the condition is always satised when the principal sets w10 as small as
possible, w10 = 0. Therefore, if 01 + (1   0) < 0, the principal sets
w11 =  =1 and her expected costs are given by
(+ )
+ 1
1
+ (1    )+ 0
0

 :
Proof of Lemma 2.
It is easy to see that agent As incentive compatibility constraint can be sim-
plied to
[(+ 1)w
A
11 + (1    1)wA10   (+ 0)wA01   (1    0)wA00]   :
Moreover, agent Bs incentive compatibility constraints can be rewritten as
1(w
B
11 wB10)   and 0(wB01 wB00)   . Hence, the principal will set wB00 =
wB10 = 0, so that the binding constraints imply w
B
11 =  =1 and w
B
01 =  =0.
With regard to agent A, the principal has to set wA00 = w
A
01 = 0 in order
to minimize her expected costs. The principal has some freedom in designing
the wages wA11 and w
A
10. All combinations of w
A
11 and w
A
10 that satisfy agent As
binding incentive compatibility constraint
(+ 1)w
A
11 + (1    1)wA10 =  =
minimize the principals expected costs. Specically, it seems to make sense not
to condition agent As wages on the outcome of the second stage, wA11 = w
A
10 =
19
 =. In any case, the principals expected costs are uniquely determined; they
are given by
(+ )

1

+
+ 1
1
+ (1    )+ 0
0

 :
Proof of Proposition 1.
Consider rst the case 01 + (1   0)  0. Inspection of Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2 immediately reveals that the principal prefers to hire only one agent
in charge of both tasks whenever
+ 

+
+ 0
0

 
 (+ )

1

+
+ 1
1
+ (1    )+ 0
0

 ;
which is equivalent to
(+ 0)1  (+ )(+ 1)0 + (1    )(+ 0)1
and which can be further simplied to 1  0. Hence, the principal prefers to
hire one agent (two agents) whenever the two tasks are conicting (synergistic).
Next, consider the case 01 + (1   0) < 0. Note that this case can
occur only if the tasks are conicting (1 < 0). In this case, it follows from
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 that the principal prefers to hire only one agent in
charge of both tasks whenever
(+ )
+ 1
1
+ (1    )+ 0
0

 
 (+ )

1

+
+ 1
1
+ (1    )+ 0
0

 :
This condition can be rewritten as 0  ( + )=, which is always satised.
Hence, the proposition follows immediately.
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Proof of Lemma 3.
It is straightforward to see that the principal will set w00 = 0. Hence, she
minimizes
(+ )[(+   )w11 + (1    + )w10] + (1    )(+   )w01
subject to the second-stage incentive compatibility constraints (w11 w10) 
 and w01   , the rst-stage incentive compatibility constraint
(+ ) (  )w11 + [(1    ) + (+ )]w10
  [(+ )(  ) + ]w01   ;
and the limited liability constraints. It is easy to verify that it is optimal for
the principal to set w01 =  =.
Suppose that
(1    ) + (+ )  0;
so that  < 0. Then the principal sets w10 = 0, so that the rst-stage incentive
compatibility constraint is binding and thus
w11 =
+ (+ )(  ) + 
(+ ) (  )   :
In this case, the constraint (w11 w10)   is non-binding and the principals
expected costs are 2[1 + =(  )] . Now suppose that
(1    ) + (+ ) > 0:
Note that if in the solution w10 > 0, then all incentive compatibility constraints
must be binding, so that w10 = ( + ) =2 and w11 = ( + 2) =2, and the
principals expected costs are [2 + (2 + )=2] . The latter expression is
smaller than 2[1+=( )] whenever  is positive. The lemma then follows
immediately.
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Proof of Lemma 4.
Observe that it is optimal for the principal to set wA00 = w
A
01 = w
B
00 = w
B
10 = 0
and wB11 = w
B
01 =  =: Agent As incentive compatibility constraint reads
(+ ) (  )wA11 + ((1    ) + (+ ))wA10   :
Suppose
(1    ) + (+ )  0;
so that  < 0. Then the principal sets wA10 = 0 and thusw
A
11 =  =[(+ ) (  )].
Next, suppose
(1    ) + (+ ) > 0:
It is straightforward to check that the principal will then set wA11 = 0 and w
A
10 =
 =[(1    )  + ( + )] if  is positive, while she sets wA10 = 0 and thus
wA11 =  =[(+ ) (  )] if  is negative. The lemma follows immediately.
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) Suppose  > 0. The principals expected costs if she hires one agent are
K1 := [2+ (2+ )=
2] , while her expected costs if she hires two agents are
K2 :=

+   

+
(1    + )(+ )
(1    ) + (+ )

 :
It is straightforward to check that
K1 =
22 + (2+ )
2
 
and
K2 =
(+   )[(1    ) + (+ )] + (1    + )(+ )
[(1    ) + (+ )]  .
Hence, the di¤erence in expected costs is
K1  K2 =   
2
(+ )
(1  ) + (+ )
(1    ) + (+ ) ;
which under our assumptions is strictly positive.
22
(ii) Suppose  < 0. The principals expected costs if she hires one agent
are K1 := 2[1 + =(   )] , while her expected costs if she hires two agents
are
K2 :=
(2  ) (+   )
(  )   :
Thus, the di¤erence in expected costs is
K2  K1 =    
 (  ) (   + ) ;
which under our assumptions is strictly positive.
(iii) Suppose  = 0. Then the principals expected costs are 2 (+ ) =,
regardless of whether she hires one or two agents.
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